Dead Cant Rant

I completely missed this one: yesterday was the anniversary of the military disaster at Desert One.

Tragedy followed frustration. As the No. 3 chopper lifted off to reposition for refueling for its return to the Nimitz, its dust cloud obscured the pilot’s view, inducing vertigo. The disoriented flyer allowed his helo to drift toward one of the EC-130s. The rotor blades slashed through the Talon, causing the helo to crash into the plane’s left wing. The helo’s internal and auxiliary fuel tanks erupted, enveloping both aircraft in flames.

“We saw blue sparks explode overhead and forward,” according to Sgt. 1st Class Eric Haney, whose troop had boarded the EC-130. “Then the crew door blew in as the flight deck erupted and flames entered the troop compartment. We hit the right side door like we were making a jump and managed to get everyone out before the fuel bladder exploded.”

The above is a shorter, more “dramatic” account. For a much more in-depth and accurate analysis of what actually took place before, during, and after the mission, including the leadership and doctrinal failures, see the paper Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military from GlobalSecurity.

The problems identified by the paper are numerous:

The mission was a high risk operation. With the complexity of the plan, there was little room for adjustment for the unexpected. The commission gave the mission a 60% chance of success if everything went exactly as planned. Mission constraints and restraints such as the distances to the objective areas, the multiple force packages, and the need for secrecy and radio silence, made adaptability and flexibility extremely limited. No plan ever survives the first engagement of the unexpected. The complicated nature of the mission left few options for adjusting the plan by either the staff or the operators. Because of the few options for the operators to adjust the plan, the mission personnel held tightly to the plan even when the unexpected, like the dust storm, dictated an adjustment. In this case, the operators drove a bad situation into something worse. The mission had a high probability of the unexpected happening due to the complexity of the plan and the unfamiliar environment. The plan was acceptable, but its feasibility was borderline because of the small margin for error and the lack of flexibility and adaptability.

Planning was adequate except for the misinterpretation of the reliability of RH-53D helicopters and the lack of preparation for dealing with the unexpected weather phenomenon. There was no doctrine for joint planning. Because the JTF staff was assembled adhoc, a foundation of continuity between the staff members did not exist. Compartmentalization was practiced to the detriment of the mission at each level of the planning. Each service planner focused on the myopic task of his particular unit.

The planning guidance for the mission limited the ability of the planners. In particular, the unusually strong secrecy requirement of the CJCS created an OPSEC “monster,” which hampered the effectiveness of the staff. In addition, the changing personnel requirements created friction among the planners causing added discontinuity.

It was a large mistake for the planners to use the fleet wide mission capable percentage for the RH-53D, particularly when the full mission capable rate of the helicopter was only 17%.[76] Finally, the staff violated a major element of a successful planning process: they did not “murder board” the plan by an independent group.

Training for the mission was adequate except for the absences of a full scale rehearsal. This conclusion by the commission was incorrect. There was no structure for joint or integrated training developed for the JTF. The complexity of the mission required the development of close coordination in the training process. Compartmental training was conducted hindering team building, which is so important for joint operations. There was little special trust and confidence built between the personnel.

Crucial refueling training was never adequately planned; the refueling portion of the plan was a critical hinge pin to mission success. In addition, face to face briefs and debriefs were never conducted by the units after training evolutions. Finally, the helicopter pilots never flew the actual mission aircraft during training. Familiarization with the aircraft was nonexistent for the mission.

A critical mistake was not executing a full scale rehearsal. With a complex mission, feasibility is often determined by the rehearsal of the mission. Planners stretched the envelop of the operators with this mission. A full scale rehearsal would have determined if the mission was reasonable as well as feasible to execute. Additionally, last minute corrections for a mission are usually identified in the rehearsal.

…

The board would endorse two conclusive findings: an overemphasis on OPSEC, and inadequate maintenance of the helicopters aboard the Navy shipping. OPSEC was a driving factor in the compartmentalization practices of the JTF. It contributed to the low number of personnel for the planning of the mission. It hampered intelligence gathering. Usually OPSEC is inherent to military operations, and if used correctly, is a force multiplier. OPSEC is a supporting element and should never be allowed to degrade mission accomplishment as it did with this mission.

The single largest failure of the entire operation was the lack of a true “joint operations mindset” among the services. The services competed with each other for resources and political prestige, often at the expense of the mission at hand. This all changed after Desert One. The failures in Operation Eagle Claw led directly to the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command and a revolution in military organization and doctrine, resulting in a true joint operational focus across all the services.

The most significant military reforms were the ratification of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the emergence of Joint Doctrine, and revitalization of SOF. All three of these reforms have a direct connection to the lessons learned during Operation Eagle Claw. All three actions dramatically changed the concepts, structures, and roles of the American Military.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act: There is no finer example of the impact of the rescue mission than this piece of legislation. Planning and organizational failures in the mission were targeted by the act. General Shalikashvili wrote, “From the vantage point of the mid-1990s, the act brought about a number of changes which together have had a revolutionary impact on the defense organization.”

…

The Goldwater-Nichols Act makes joint operations the law for the services. The act establishes the JCS as responsible for developing Joint Doctrine. The doctrine provides guidance for joint operations. Joint Doctrine was validated with the successful results in operations Desert Shield/Storm. The joint warfighting philosophy of combining forces to synchronize their activities against the enemy was executed to perfection. The Armed Forces Military Education programs now teaches military students that America will always fight as a joint force.

The Navy CH-53 Sea Stallion and the much-maligned Marine MV-22 Osprey were created specifically because of the technological shortcomings exposed by Desert One.

Sgt. 1st Class Haney (mentioned earlier) is Command Sergeant Major Haney, a “plank owner” of Delta Force, one of the first operators chosen for the newly-created unit. His book Inside Delta Force is one of the most amazing books detailing special operations and operators that I have ever read. He provides all of the above details, and more, along with vivid accounts of the Delta selection process, organization, training, CIA tradecraft, missions, and political obstacles. Simply an incredible book.

As I finish writing this, my Winamp playlist has shuffled in “Go To Their Graves Like Beds” from the Gods & Generals soundtrack.